Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) can be used to generate cryptographic keys by making use of the intrinsic randomness resulting from manufacturing variations. Error correction codes (ECCs) help to make SRAM-PUFs, which are always effected by noise and environmental changes, suitable for security applications. In this paper, we propose practical error correction schemes for PUF-based secret generation that are based on polar codes. The proposed scheme could generate a 128bit key using 1024 PUF bits and 896 helper data bits and achieve a failure probability of 10 −9 or lower for a practical SRAM-PUFs setting with cross-over probability of 15%. The method is based on successive cancellation in combination with list decoding and hash-based checking, making use of the hash that is already available at the decoder. In addition, an adaptive list decoder for polar codes is investigated. This decoder increases the list size only if needed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) are hardware intrinsic security primitives used to realize cryptographic scenarios such as identification, authentication and secret key generation. PUFs avoid the need for key storage, since the device-unique randomness can be translated into a cryptographic key.
Here we focus on static random-access memory PUFs (SRAM-PUFs). SRAM-PUFs enjoy the properties that, while being easily evaluated (after a device power-up), they are unique, reproducible, physically unclonable and unpredictable [1] . Therefore SRAM-PUFs are considered to combine very well with authentication and unique cryptographic key generation for resource constrained devices. However, SRAM-PUFs cannot be straightforwardly used as cryptographic keys, since their observations are not exactly reproducible due to environmental condition changes such as time, temperature, voltage and random noise. Therefore, error correction techniques are necessary to mitigate these effects and generate reliable keys.
In order to reconstruct PUF responses and extract cryptographic keys from the noisy data source, helper-data schemes were proposed in [2] . Over the last years, some practical algorithms have been introduced in [3]- [5] . For practical implementation on resource-constrained devices, it is crucial to construct good error correction codes jointly considering error probabilities, implementation complexity and secrecy leakage.
Polar codes, proposed by Arikan [6] , are perhaps the first codes proved to achieve capacity for arbitrary binary-input discrete memoryless channels (B-DMCs) with low encoding and decoding complexity. For finite block-length, the performance of polar codes is improved by implementing enhanced decoding algorithms based on the classical successive cancellation decoder (SCD) [6] , [7] . Polar codes have been investigated for the Slepian-Wolf problem [8] and key generation [9] .
In this paper, we introduce polar codes and a syndromebased coding scheme that constructs syndromes (helper data) and codewords from the polar code construction for key generation applications for SRAM-PUFs. To guarantee the performance in terms of reliability and security, and to decrease the required memory size of this scheme, we apply efficient techniques including, (1) exploiting the efficient decoding algorithm based on successive cancellation and list decoding to reliably regenerate the secret, (2) proving zero-leakage for the proposed scheme, and (3) using a puncturing scheme to shorten the code length and reduce the complexity. Our simulation results show that 10 −9 failure probability can be achieved with less PUF bits and helper data bits than before. Using puncturing for polar coding schemes results in flexibility in getting the required code rates, which is crucial since key sizes in practical applications are typically fixed. It has been experimentally demonstrated [10] that due to the independent random nature of process variations on each SRAM cell, SRAM patterns demonstrates excellent PUF behavior, i.e. empirical probability of number of cells that go in state 1 is close to 0.5. Therefore in this paper we assume that SRAM-PUFs are binary-symmetric, hence for enrollment and arXiv:1701.07320v1 [cs.IT] 25 Jan 2017 authentication PUF pairs (X N , Y N ) it holds that
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where Q(0, 1) = Q(1, 0) = p/2 and Q(0, 0) = Q(1, 1) = (1 − p)/2 and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1/2. It is our goal to share a PUF-based secret key S between an encoder (representing a PUF-device) and a decoder (representing a server), see Fig. 1 . We focus on the secret-generation setting. During the key generation phase, the encoder observes SRAM-PUF enrollment measurement X N and based on it generates a secret-key S and helper data W, as (S, W ) = enc(X N ). Here enc(·) is an encoder mapping. Since the key is used for cryptographic purposes, it has to be uniformly distributed. Moreover, the helper data is assumed to be publicly available, and thus it should leak no information about the key, i.e. I(S; W ) = 0.
Next during the secret regeneration phase, the decoder observes the authentication SRAM-PUF measurement Y N and the corresponding helper data W. The decoder now forms an estimate of the secret key as S = dec(Y N , W ), with dec(·) being a decoder mapping. To ensure the system reliability, the error probability Pr{ S = S} should be small.
The secret-generation problem is closely related to the Slepian-Wolf coding problem and is often realized using syndrome construction, where the helper data is the syndrome of the enrollment observation. Due to high error rates in SRAM-PUFs, 15% − 30%, combined with demands of having Pr{ S = S} of 10 −9 in practical application, powerful codes are required for reliable key generation. In this paper we explore the use of polar codes for SRAM-PUF secret generation based on syndrome construction.
III. POLAR CODES
As a family of linear block codes, a binary polar code can be specified by (N, K, F, u F ), where N = 2 n is the block length, K is the number of information bits encoded per codeword, F is a set of indices for the N − K frozen bits positions from {1, 2, ..., N } and u F is a vector of frozen bits. The frozen bits are assigned by a fixed binary sequence, which is known to both the encoder and the decoder.
A. Code Construction of Polar Codes
Polar codes are channel specific codes, which means that a polar code designed for a particular channel might not have an optimal performance for other channels. Therefore, calculation of channel reliability and selection of good channels is a critical step for polar coding, which is often referred to as polar code construction. The original construction of polar codes is based on the Bhattacharyya bound approximation [6] . Later proposed algorithms improve on this approximation at the cost of higher complexity [11] - [13] .
B. Encoding of Polar Codes
For an (N, K, F) polar code, the encoding operation for vector of information bits u can be represented by a generator matrix,
where G 2 = 1 0 1 1 and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product.
Given the data sequence U, the codewords are generated as
where F c {1, ..., N }\F corresponds to the non-frozen bits indices. U F c is the data sequence, and U F are the frozen bits.
C. Decoding of Polar codes
Polar codes achieve the channel capacity asymptotically in code length when decoded using the successive-cancellation (SC) decoding algorithm, which sequentially estimates the bitŝ
When polar decoder decodes the ith bit,û i is estimated based on the channel output y N and the previous bit decisionŝ u 1û2 . . .û i−1 , denoted byû i−1 1 . It uses the following rules:
where
) is a likelihood ratio (LLR), which determines the probability of a non-frozen bit. LLRs can be computed recursively using two formulas:
whereû 2i−2 o andû 2i−2 e denote, respectively, the odd and even indices part ofû 2i−2 .
Since the cost of implementing these multiplications and divisions operations in hardware is very high, they are usually avoided and performed in the logarithm domain using the following f and g functions:
. In practical implementations, the minimum function can be used to approximate the f function.
Thus, calculation of LLRs at length N can be reduced to calculation of two LLRs at length N/2, and then recursively break down to block length 1. The initial LLRs can be directly calculated from the channel observation.
IV. HELPER-DATA SCHEMES BASED ON POLAR CODES Now we show how secrets and helper data can be constructed using a polar code for PUF-based key generation. 1) Enrollment phase: In the enrollment phase, an individual code U N = X N G N will be generated for each PUF response X N . Then, the syndrome encoder selects the secret key S K and public helper data W N −K from the constructed polar code C N (N, K, F). Define the public helper data and the key as
where F and F c are the sets for the syndrome and the key.
We also define the sets as
where δ 2 −N β and β ∈ [0, 1/2]. An example of the syndrome encoding procedure for a (8,3,{1,2,3,4,6}) polar codes is shown in Fig. 3 , where the signal flow from right to left. Due to flexibility of the codes construction, an arbitrary code rate R = K/N can be selected without re-constructing the code.
2) Key regeneration phase: In the key regeneration phase, the syndrome decoder observes the authentication sequence Y N and also receives the public helper data W N −K . The decoder can computeŜ K using the SC decoding algorithm, which was presented in Section III-C. The regenerated keŷ S K is decoded asŜ
where the polar decoder SCD(·) is given in Algorithm 1. Although the SC decoder could asymptotically achieve channel capacity as N increases, the performance of the SC decoder is still not good enough at short and moderate block length size for error correction in PUFs due to the poor polarization. To overcome this problem, it is necessary to track multiple possible decision paths instead of only one as the SC decoder does. Considering the all 2 K possible decoding paths is impractical and too complex, the SC list (SCL) decoding algorithm uses maximum list size L to restrict the complexity [7] . SCL decoding algorithm uses a breadth search method to explore the possible decoding paths efficiently and saves L most reliable paths as candidates at each level.
In the SCL decoding process, the correct codewords are on the decoding list but they are not always the most likely ones, which leads to decoding errors. This issue can be solved by combining the SCL algorithm with a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) code, which could further improve the error correction performance [14] . For security purposes, the CRC function can be replaced by a more secure hash function. In this hash-aided SCL (HA-SCL) method, the decoder outputs L candidate sequences and selects the hash-valid sequence.
By implementing the HA-SCL method, extra M bits need to be produced as Z M at the encoder and stored at the decoder. Since the decoder knows W N −K and Z M in advance, it could recover the secret key as well as the PUF response by performing the polar decoding, as shown in Fig. 2 ,
where SCLD(·) is the polar decoder with the SCL decoding algorithm of [7] .
B. Security analysis
In this section, we analyze the secrecy for the proposed syndrome based polar coding scheme. From the previous subsection and Fig. 1 , we can see that during enrollment an SRAM-PUF measurement X N is observed, and the helper data W N −K and secret S K are generated. To prove that the helper data do not leak any information about the secret key we must show that I(S K ; W N −K ) = 0.
We re-write Eq. (9) as
where generator matrix G F for frozen bits (helper data) and generator matrix G F c for information bits (key) with dimensions N ×(N −K) and N ×K are obtained by selecting columns of G N . Then, we obtain
where in (a) we use the uniformity of the PUF response bits; in (b) the fact that the generator matrices are linearly independent, G F and G F c are non-overlapping, since F c ∩ F = φ. Thus we show zero-leakage for the proposed polar syndrome coding scheme.
V. PERFORMANCE AND COMPLEXITY COMPARISONS
In this section, we present the performance of polar code based error correction schemes for an SRAM-PUF with average bit error probability between 15% and 30%.
Inputs to the polar decoder, including the information set, frozen bit vector and channel output vector, determine the error correction ability and computational complexity. Therefore, by designing the same polar code construction, the two secret key generation schemes with the syndrome construction and code-offset construction have the same error correction performance as well as the computational complexity. For the sake of simplicity and space limitation, we only show the simulation results of syndrome construction. In order to generate sufficiently reliable keys, we design the scheme to generate a 128-bit key with the error probabilities in the range of 10 −6 down to 10 −9 .
As we discussed in Section III, the performance of polar codes is sensitive to the choice of the set F. The polar codes for specific channel condition should be constructed to select the bits and their indices for both secret and helper bits. In this paper, we use the original polar code construction to calculate the Bahattacharyya parameters of channels, by applying the following recursion for j = 0, . . . , n − 1 with initial z 0,0 = 2 p(1 − p) of BSC [12] ,
where the indices of the highest N − K values z n,i in the set of N will be chosen as the set F. Due to the non-universality of polar codes, specific value p = 15% of channel condition for a practical case of SRAM-PUF is chosen to construct an optimal polar code for all simulations.
We construct polar codes with block length N = 1024. In order to provide a flexible code rate and use less SRAM-PUFs bits in PUF-based security applications with fixed size key, arbitrary block-length polar codes can be obtained by puncturing. For any puncturing pattern, N = N −m PUFs bits and m random bits as punctured bits are the input to the polar encoder. At the decoder, m zero-valued LLRs for decoding are assigned to the corresponding punctured bits. In the following sections, both SC and HA-SCL decoding algorithms for polar codes and punctured polar codes are simulated to trade-off between error correction performance and complexity.
A. Failure probability
The most important performance criterion for PUF error correction is the error probability (or failure probability) of the key regeneration. Fig. 4 gives the error correction performance of polar code based syndrome coding schemes based on the SC and HA-SCL decoding algorithm. Here SC and HA-SCL with different configurations are simulated.
We can see that the failure rate of polar codes with SC decoding is close to 10 −6 at 15% and HA-SCL decoding can further reduce the failure rate to less than 10 −9 at 15% as list size L increases, but at the cost of extra computational complexity and memory. We can also observe that punctured polar codes with block lengths not being a power of two achieve similar failure rates as conventional polar codes by using larger L for performance compensation. For strong reliability applications, the proposed polar code (1024, 128) with L = 2 and the punctured polar code (974, 128) with L = 4 can be used to achieve an error rate of 10 −9 at crossover probability 15%.
B. Complexity and memory requirements
The number of required SRAM-PUF bits and helper date size is another important performance criterion closely related to implementation complexity. The proposed polar code based syndrome coding scheme requires 1024 PUF response bits and 896 helper data bits, if we implement the SC decoding algorithm. The corresponding decoding computational complexity is given by O(N log N ). Since a list decoder outputs a group of L reliable candidates, the decoding computational complexity of the HA-SCL algorithm is increased to O (LN log N ) , where L is the list size. Table I summarizes performance properties for the proposed polar codes and reference designs, including the achievable key regeneration failure rate, the required PUF response size, helper data size and cross-over probability p of the SRAM-PUFs. An SRAM-PUF with a cross-over probability of 15% or lower and failure rates 10 −6 and 10 −9 are targeted for different use cases, respectively. From Table I , we can clearly see that our polar code based schemes outperform the previous designs in terms of the error correction performance, SRAM-PUF response bits and helper data bits requirements. Note that the required SRAM-PUF response size could be further reduced by using punctured polar codes and increasing the list size L, but at the cost of computational and memory complexity.
C. Adaptive decoder
The HA-SCL decoding algorithm provides a good performance but also has a long latency and consequently a low throughput due to higher complexity O(LN log N ) as L and N increase. Therefore, the complexity issue of the SCL can be improved by using an adaptive decoder, which consists of two components, SC and SCL decoders. This adaptive decoder, only implements the SCL decoder and increases the value of L when the SC decoder output has an invalid hash vector. Fig. 5 shows the comparison of complexity between the adaptive decoder, single SC decoder and single HA-SCL decoder with different L. Computational complexity is defined in terms of the average number of metric update operations f (·) and g(·) in Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) . The maximum L max is set to 8 to ensure the reliability and security. As expected, the SC decoder has the lowest complexity with poor performance and the SCL decoder has higher complexity in terms of L. Furthermore, we see that the average number of computations of the adaptive decoder is drastically reduced as the crossover probability p decreases. Therefore, the adaptive decoder could provide similar computational complexity with a single SC decoder when p is small.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigated practical polar code based syndrome coding schemes that treat the PUF response bits as a codeword of a polar code and generate helper data bits to correct the errors between the noisy PUF responses. Our simulation results show that reliability (small failure probabilities) can be achieved together with high security. Furthermore, the proposed scheme requires less SRAM-PUF bits and helper data bits compared to existing schemes, which leads to the reduction in memory requirements.
